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Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to see if companies in a market that is not 
considered segmented can create value through the strategies of 
importing foreign outsider board members or cross-listing on other 
non-segmented markets. Additionally the study will analyze the degree 
of integration between the two markets in respect to corporate 
governance and financial systems 
 
Methodology: The study is based on a quantitative methodology. We employ a 
multiple regression in an attempt to separate the effects between the 
U.S. listing and outsider U.S. board membership on firm value. The 
analysis is done with a multivariate OLS-regression model with firm 
value as the dependent variable. Various regression models are 
employed in an attempt to show the hypothesis’ significance. The 
intention with the usage of more than one statistical technique is to 
obtain a higher degree of validity of the results. We also utilize eight 
theoretically grounded control variables in order to single out the real 
effect of the independent variables 
 
Conclusions: We find that U.K firms cannot create value or lower their cost of 
capital by cross-listing on the U.S. market or by importing a U.S. board 
member. However, the results indicate that U.K. firms are able to 
create value by cross-listing on markets considered less well-integrated 
markets. We also find that the U.K. and U.S. market are well integrated 
both in regards to corporate governance and capital markets. Lastly, we 
conclude that the U.S. cost of capital is a poor proxy for the global cost 
of capital.   
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1. Introduction 
The first chapter describes the background, motivation, problem and purpose of the paper. 
Additionally we present the limitations and disposition of the paper.   
 
In pursuit of higher profits and wealth generated to the shareholders, companies continue to strive 
for lower cost of capital and thereby, higher firm valuations. Finance literature and research 
frequently discusses the desirability of attaining the global cost of capital which often in concrete 
studies uses the cost of capital on the U.S. financial market as a proxy.   
 
Earlier studies covering capital costs and stock market valuations have analyzed the valuation 
effects of foreign company listings on U.S. exchanges1, markets initial reactions to cross-listing2, 
and the impact on value by importing an independent foreign board member.3 The findings (e.g. 
Forester and Karolyi, 1999, Hargis, 2000, Modén and Oxelheim, 1997) conclusively suggest that 
cross-listing has a positive effect on firm valuation and is further increased if it is combined with 
a simultaneous issuance of equity in the cross-listing market.4 Studies regarding independent 
foreign board members have also shown to have a positive effect on firm value.5  
 
In this study, we focus on the two strategies suggested by Oxelheim and Randøy for achieving 
the global cost of capital, cross-listing and importing foreign board members from countries with 
more demanding corporate governance systems.6 
1.1 Background 
The global financial market has in the last three decades gone through dramatic transformations. 
Instead of consisting of several segmented national financial markets the global market has 
evolved to a more or less perfectly integrated and globalized system. This system of a global 
financial market has become noticeably more efficient than the traditional system with segmented 
national financial markets. Some of the major benefits with a globalized financial system are, 
efficiency gains due to specialization in the production of financial services, increased efficiency 
in national financial sectors as a result from stiffer international competition, more effective 
allocation of capital on a global scale and increasing opportunities of international 
diversification.7 
 
In the absence of global financial institutions, like a world central bank, the global financial 
system consists of the interaction of all the national financial systems. The level of interaction 
and integration is determined in part by politicians controlling the level of deregulation of 
national financial systems and partly by the degree of cross-border capital flows mainly induced 
by large corporations seeking arbitrage transactions between less efficient and more efficient 
                                                
1 Sundaram and Louge (1996)  
2 Several studies have been conducted on this subject, among them Miller (1999), Modén and Oxelheim (1997), 
Howe and Kelm (1987) and Foerster and Karolyi (1999) 
3 Oxelheim and Randøy (2003).  
4 Modén and Oxelheim (1997)  
5 Oxelheim and Randøy (2003) 
6 Oxelheim and Randøy, p. 2371 
7 Oxelheim (1996), p. 34 
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national markets.8 This development of deregulation will likely continue as financial and 
economic deregulation continues in numerous countries. 
 
One recent example of continued integration is the induction of ten new members in the 
European Union on May 1, 2004. Although not yet financially integrated with the rest of Europe 
the entrance into the EU will likely lead to increased financial integration of these countries into 
the global system. 
 
With increasing integration of world markets, the hampering segmentation effects are implicitly 
decreasing. The elimination of segmentation and increased cross-border financial investments 
offer firms more opportunity to achieve a lower cost of capital through reduced agency and 
information costs. It has already been established that companies in a segmented home market 
can create shareholder value by breaking away from the segmented market. In a segmented home 
market where the capital market is not well integrated with the international capital market, firms 
tend to face a higher cost of capital because of the increased risk mainly borne by investors in the 
home country. According to Doidge,9 the hypothesis of achieving a lower cost of capital through 
risk diversification with non-residents is known to face a few difficulties. Studies have shown 
that cross-listing firms from countries considered well integrated with the U.S. capital market 
also profit from cross-listing, furthermore cross-listings continue to increase and still shows 
increased positive signaling effects even as international capital markets are more integrated. In 
addition, studies have shown as the number of cross-listing firms from one country increases, the 
abnormal return on announcement of cross-listing does not decrease. This effect has been 
interpreted as evidence against the global risk diversification hypothesis10. Because of these 
difficulties other potential benefits from cross-listing that have been suggested are,11  
 
• Reduced risk premium- As the shareholder base increases risk sharing increases and the 
premium demanded for bearing risk is reduced. 
• Access to more developed capital markets- The highly liquid and deep U.S. market tends 
to reduce firms barriers to credit. 
• Information disclosure- U.S. markets have stringent information requirements. 
• Bonding and Monitoring- A U.S. listing increases the protection of the firm’s investors 
and lowers the agency costs of controlling the shareholders.  
 
Cross-listing is the most commonly used alternative to break away from the domestic corporate 
governance system.12 Another financial alternative is issuance of bonds on foreign markets. A 
different alternative is through appointing a foreign independent board member. This alternative 
enables companies to incorporate a different corporate governance system. In either case, 
companies achieve value through increased access to investors.  The most beneficial choice of the 
two mentioned or a combination of both should be based on the company’s initial global 
                                                
8 Oxelheim (1996), p. 21-24 
9 Doidge, et al. (2002) 
10 Refers to risk sharing of non-residents with residents. 
11 Doidge, et al. p. 208-209  
12 Oxelheim and Randøy, p. 2370 
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recognition, costs associated with the alternative and what goals the company aims to achieve 
with the internationalization of the cost of capital.13 
 
Jensen and Meckling14 define agency cost as “the sum of: 1. the monitoring expenditures by the 
principal, 2. the bonding expenditures by the agent, 3. the residual loss.” Agency costs arise when 
the agency relationship, defined by Jensen and Meckling as “a contract under which one or more 
persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their 
behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent”15, is suboptimal 
and the agent does not act in the best interest of the principal. Agency costs arise at any time 
where there is a collaborative effort between two or more people. The shareholders and managers 
relationship fit the definition of a pure agency relationship and have been the subject of numerous 
studies16. Our interest lies in the contribution of agency costs to the overall cost of capital and if 
including an outsider foreign board member can indirectly lower the cost of agency and therefore 
the cost of capital. If this is the case shareholder value can be increased by including an outsider 
foreign board member and indirectly lower agency costs.   
1.2 Problem Discussion 
The motivation for this paper is to focus on companies in a non-segmented market and to 
determine if value can be created through the alternative cross-listing or by including a foreign 
independent board member on the board of directors. This is interesting not only for companies 
in already integrated markets but also for all companies considering the increasing financial 
integration of markets worldwide. 
 
Our scope involves studying the valuation effects of firms from the non-segmented U.K. market 
cross-listing in the U.S. markets. The valuation effects of independent foreign board membership 
for firms are also investigated specifically in companies with board members from the United 
States, in companies based and listed in the United Kingdom. With the similar corporate 
governance traditions and disclosure requirements in both countries, we will control for firm-
specific variables as well as other variables, to evaluate the impact on firm value. 
 
Our contribution lies in the uniqueness of our study, if we find an effect in a set of U.K. based 
firms it is likely to be a small effect. This would still imply that there is value associated with 
further integration in markets already considered well integrated. After much research we have 
not encountered any previous studies analyzing this particular aspect of foreign board 
membership and between two countries considered non-segmented. Many earlier studies purely 
involve two very different countries in regards to their financial integration with no mention of 
board membership. By analyzing the effectiveness of importing an independent foreign board 
member or cross-listing, we provide additional insight into further understanding the means to 
achieving a global cost of capital. Furthermore, we provide additional evidence regarding the 
                                                
13 Modén and Oxelheim, p. 224 
14 Jensen and Meckling (1976), p. 310-311 
15 Ibid. 
16 For a survey of the literature on agency relationships, see Jensen and Meckling (1976). For a recent survey on 
agency cost literature, see Schleifer and Vishny (1997).   
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degree of how well integrated the U.S. and U.K. capital markets are both in terms of corporate 
governance and the financial integration. 
 
Examples of studies covering cross-listing and foreign board membership on integrated and 
segmented markets are presented in the table below. 
 
 Integrated markets Segmented markets 
Cross-listing Ely and Salehizadeh (2001) 
Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2002) 
Leuz (2003) 
Einarsson and Nifelhelm (2004) 
Sundaram and Louge (1996) 
Modén and Oxelheim (1997) 
Foerster and Karolyi (1999) 
Miller (1999) 
Ely and Salehizadeh (2001) 
Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2002) 
Leuz (2003) 
Foreign board membership  
Einarsson and Nifelhelm (2004) 
 
 
 
Oxelheim and Randøy (2003) 
 
 
 
This topic is of interest for companies in both segmented markets as well as integrated markets. 
With many different options for attaining lower cost of capital, it is important for small and 
medium firms to be aware of the options available. By importing a foreign board member, it is 
possible these firms can substantially lower their cost of capital at a relatively low cost when 
compared to cross-listing. However, by combining the strategies firms in segmented home 
markets can achieve the global cost of capital and continue to grow and create shareholder value 
because of the increasing access to capital. 
 
Of equal importance is the more theoretical question of to which degree these two countries, not 
considered to be segmented, really are integrated in respect of both corporate governance and the 
financial systems. If it is the case that firms in non-segmented markets can create value by 
utilizing these strategies to achieve a lower cost of capital this leads us to conclude that these 
markets actually are not well integrated and do not enjoy the global cost of capital. 
1.3 Purpose 
The purpose of this paper is to see if companies in a market that is not considered segmented can 
create value through the strategies of importing foreign outsider board members or cross-listing 
on other non-segmented markets. Additionally the study will analyze the degree of integration 
between the two markets in respect to corporate governance and financial systems.   
1.4 Limitations 
Because of the limited scope of the master’s thesis we are narrowing our analysis to the question 
whether U.K. based firms can achieve lower cost of capital and thereby create shareholder value 
by utilizing either cross-listing in the U.S. or importing an foreign outsider board member from 
the U.S. Additionally, with the limited timeframe involved we have chosen to evaluate 120 
companies with three observation years each totaling to 360 observations. 
1.5 Disposition 
In chapter two we explain the underlying theory of our paper. Chapter three covers the methods 
used to conduct our study with our explanation of the data and variables used. In chapter four we 
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present the results from our group comparisons and regression models. Chapter five contains our 
analysis of the results and in chapter six we conclude and suggest further research routes and 
topics.  
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2. Theory and Literature Review 
This chapter gives the theoretical background of the paper. We also cover earlier studies on the 
subject of agency theory, agency costs, corporate governance, outside board member and cross-
listing.    
 
The various aspects and impacts of agency theory, agency costs, corporate governance, outside 
board member and cross-listing on firm value has been covered in prior studies to great detail. In 
this chapter, we cover some of the underlying theories, significant findings of prior studies and 
we explain the four acknowledged corporate governance systems that exist. The chapter also 
contains a comparison of the financial systems of the U.S. and the U.K. This is done to aid the 
understanding of the two systems and why they are often considered similar. We also cover the 
advantages and disadvantages between the two systems from an agent theoretical perspective.   
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) established the initial work on agency theory but the problem of 
separation of ownership and control concerned scholars of corporations as early as Adam 
Smith.17 Managers have a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation to maximize the 
shareholders’ wealth. However, the actual incentive of managers may be to maximize their own 
wealth, which is where agency costs and costs of agency control occur. Agency problems exist 
because contracts are not free to enter into or free to enforce.18 Agency costs arise when the cost 
of full enforcement of contractual obligations exceeds the benefits. Costs include cost of 
monitoring, structuring, and linking sets of contracts between agents with opposing interests.19 
Research on agency theory has hypothesized a few strategies to control agency costs. The 
variables that have shown to limit agency costs are debt/equity (i.e. leverage), dividend policy, 
executive compensation, and institutional ownership.20 Different variations of the executive 
compensation package have been suggested to further alleviate the principal-agent problem, such 
as holding the CEO’s stock in a non-voting escrow account with a pre-set timeframe for 
withdrawal.21 
 
With a recent surge in mergers and acquisitions (M&A), it is of utmost importance for 
shareholders to be aware of the principal-agent problem and agents’ tendency for empire 
building. When the board of directors does not properly monitor management’s actions and 
sufficient checks and balances are not in place owners can suffer large losses in value. There are 
unfortunately numerous examples of insufficient control by boards and failed M&As, for 
example see DaimlerChrysler, Tyco, AT&T, and WorldCom.22 
 
Our study indirectly addresses agency costs. The board of directors is one of the internal 
governance mechanisms in agency theory by which agency costs can be reduced.23 Some of the 
assumptions involved in the justification for using an outsider foreign board member are that 
                                                
17 Fama and Jensen, (1983) Separation of Ownership and Control, p. 301 
18 Fama and Jensen, (1983) Agency Problems and Residual Claims, p. 327 
19 Ibid.  
20 Crutchley, et al, p. 177 
21 Bruhl, p. 402 
22 Gaughan, p. 21 
23 Nowak and McCabe, p. 301 
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independent board members should reduce the agency costs and assert more control, i.e. 
increased control of management. In addition, it will increase alignment of the agent’s goals with 
the principal’s. This, we argue, will increase shareholder value and lower the cost of capital. 
Importing an outsider foreign board member can also reasonably be argued to reduce the old 
boy’s network existing in many country’s boardrooms. 
 
There are many hypotheses on the sources of cross-listing effects. Cross-listing on a U.S. 
exchange is regarded to raise the visibility of foreign firms to American investors and 
institutions.24In addition, many American institutional investors are prohibited to invest in non 
U.S.-listed foreign firms.25 One of the most important features of a foreign exchange listing is 
bridging of cross-border information gaps. By this, the firm gains access to new investors, which 
can create value for the existing shareholders. By cross-listing companies’ ownership also 
becomes more dispersed, and imposed on them are harsher information requirements from 
foreign owners more likely to hold management and the board accountable.26 The logic is if it is 
easier for foreign investors to invest, risk sharing and diversification are enhanced, leading to a 
lower cost of capital for the firm.  
2.1 Corporate governance systems 
Corporate governance mechanisms can be disassembled into economic and legal institutions that 
can be changed through the legislative process.27 Four corporate governance systems are 
mentioned in the literature, Anglo-Saxon or Anglo-American, German, Japanese, and the Latin 
system.28 Generally, the Anglo-American is regarded as the most demanding system with the 
Latin being the least demanding.29 The Latin is regarded as being undeveloped to the point that it 
limits the external flow of capital to the companies adhering to this system.30 The emerging 
markets of the world, Russia and other countries, lack recognized corporate governance 
mechanisms. This substantially hinders investments made in these economies. 
 
As fore mentioned, it is generally regarded that the Anglo-American corporate governance 
system is the most stringent when it comes to information disclosures, and is most beneficial to 
the suppliers of financing.31 The Anglo-American corporate governance system consists of 
shareholder-centered corporate governance with weak financial intermediaries and well-
developed capital markets. However, as recent events in the United States have shown, the 
system is far from perfect. (For examples see, WorldCom, Enron, Global Crossing, Kmart, 
Martha Stewart, etc) 
 
In the field of corporate governance an issue currently encountered by managers, shareholders, 
and directors is the cultural, gender, and racial composition of the board of directors. The issue of 
the board’s cultural composition has received much public attention with major institutional 
shareholders adopting investment policies to promote diversity. One example is TIAA-CREF (a 
                                                
24 Leuz, p. 359 
25 Ibid. p. 350 
26 Oxelheim and Randøy, p. 2374 
27 Schleifer and Vishny, p. 738 
28 Ibid. 
29 Oxelheim and Randøy, p. 2370 
30 Schleifer and Vishny, p. 738 
31 Doidge, et al, p. 208-209  
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major U.S. based pension fund) and their investment criterion of diversity. TIAA-CREF believes 
that diversity on the board of directors will equal less indebtedness to management.32 Many 
corporations also realize the advantages of board diversity. As Sun Oil’s CEO Robert Campbell 
wrote, “Often what a woman or minority person can bring to the board is some perspective a 
company has not had before—adding some modern-day reality to the deliberation process. Those 
perspectives are of great value, and often missing from an all-white, male gathering. They can 
also be an inspiration to the company’s diverse workforce.”33 However, many companies reject 
the current trend of incorporating diverse, be it racial or gender, board members unless it actually 
enhances shareholder value. The argument is that board diversity for its own sake is pure 
tokenism.34 This can be interpreted as an argument from the “old-boy’s network” and its response 
to their cognitive dissonance35. Meanwhile it is an additional argument for investigating the 
independent board member and its role in creating shareholder value.  
2.2 Comparison of financial systems – U.S. and U.K.  
The creation of the U.S.’s Securities and Exchange Commission, the SEC, came out of the stock 
market crash in New York 1929. At that time there was little regulation of the financial and 
securities markets in the United States. In popular fashion post crash hearings were held to 
determine what went amiss and what could be done to prevent any future crashes. Out of these 
hearings came the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. These laws 
were created to restore confidence in the financial and securities markets in the U.S. Monitoring 
the financial and securities industries demanded a coordinated effort and the SEC was created in 
1934. Then President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed Joseph Kennedy to serve as the first chair 
of the SEC.36 
 
Recent legislative developments in the United States have been enacted in response to the 
accounting scandals of Enron among others. President George W. Bush signed into law the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. It regulates the disclosure and corporate governance standards such 
as executive compensation, and the use of independent directors. The law was intended to have 
companies in compliance in the fall of 2003 but extensions were approved and compliance for 
large companies is now June 15, 2004 and small companies have until April 15, 2005.37 The 
impact of the Act is yet unknown and the full scope of it will not be known until the Act has been 
vetted through the judicial system. However there are accounts of management questioning 
whether to remain a public company or not.38 There are also concerns over the additional 
requirements imposed on foreign companies for listing in the United States.39 The Act involves 
forcing foreign companies to adopt and accept U.S. accounting rules. In the past, the SEC has 
                                                
32 Carter, et al, p.34 
33 Ibid.  
34 Ibid. 
35 The theory on cognitive dissonance was pioneered by Leon Festinger (1957) and is believed to occur in situations 
when an individual must choose between two incompatible actions or beliefs. In our case it would be the collective 
beliefs of the “old-boy’s network” and its dissonant belief that the status quo of old boys on boards is fine with the 
changes demanded by investors to incorporate diversity. Their response is to reduce the importance of diversity to 
eliminate the dissonance they face.   
36U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, www.sec.gov 
37 Security and Sarbanes-Oxley, 
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/originalContent/0,289142,sid14_gci929451,00.html  
38 Miller and Frankenthaler, p. 7  
39 Stevens, p. 36 
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made modifications to suit foreign companies listed on U.S. exchanges, but it seems unlikely that 
will happen this time around.40  
 
The Financial Services Authority, FSA, is coterminous to the SEC. However, with one major 
difference, the FSA is an independent non-governmental body that was given statutory powers 
through the Financial Services and Markets Act in 2000.41  The history of regulation in the U.K. 
is different from that in the U.S. Self-regulation has been a staple of the U.K. financial system. 
The system is still self-regulated with the FSA providing the statutory framework.42 In 1997, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer announced the reforms of the financial services regulation and 
merged the banking supervision and investment services regulation into the Securities and 
Investments Board, SIB, which later in 1997 changed its name to FSA.43 
 
The U.K. response to corporate scandals differs significantly from how the issue was handled by 
the SEC in the U.S. The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry set up an independent review 
headed by Derek Higgs to evaluate the role and efficacy of independent directors. The outcome 
of the Higgs Review, which it is known as, was a number of recommendations on the structure of 
the board, the role and other commitments of the chair, the role of the non-executive director, the 
recruitment and appointment procedures to the board, the training and professional development 
of directors, the tenure and time commitment, renumeration, resignation procedures, audit and 
renumeration committees, liability and relationship with shareholders.44 Some of the 
recommendations were controversial. One of these included the limitations on how many chairs 
one person could hold at one time.45 In addition, Higgs recommended a stricter interpretation of 
independence that would rule out a CEO becoming the chair of the board. The U.K. government 
and the FSA supported the recommendations, which led to their adoption into the Combined 
Code in July of 2003.46  The Combined Code consists of a range of corporate governance 
declarations over the years combined into one expression of best business practices.47 
 
The two different approaches to financial market regulation, with the U.S. more prone to legislate 
and the U.K. prone to issue recommendations and principles, have led to different strategies 
utilized by companies to comply or circumvent these regulations. More simply, U.S. companies 
try to find loopholes that do not contradict the letter intent of the regulations, while with the U.K. 
recommendations and principles companies can either adhere to them or not. There is little 
uncertainty about the interpretation involved.48 
 
 
 
 
                                                
40 Greene, p. 15 
41 The Financial Services Authority, www.fsa.gov.co.uk/history 
42 Spalek, p. 75 
43 The Financial Services Authority, www.fsa.gov.co.uk/history 
44 Jones and Pollitt, p. 165 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Davies p. 250 
48 Keenan, p. 174 
 12 
There are great similarities between the U.K. and U.S. financial systems. Some of the notable 
similarities are: 
• Both are capital market dominated financial systems (U.S. capital system is the most 
developed in the world.)49 
• Both systems have a large proportion of widely held50 corporations (U.K. has a slightly 
higher proportion)51 
• Both have major financial centers, i.e. London/New York. Access to major markets. 
• Both are considered to adhere to the Anglo-American corporate governance system, 
which is regarded as the most demanding system and superior in market performance 
(U.S. system in particular)52 53 
 
Some of the U.S. advantages/strengths compared to the U.K.: 
• Strict information, disclosure requirements by the SEC54 55 
• “Sacking the boss”56. The chief executive turnover in the U.S. has reached unprecedented 
levels in recent years. The similarity between the turnover in the world of sports, coaches 
changing teams almost weekly, and the corporate world, CEOs, is striking. 
• In the U.S., usually only the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer are on 
the board of directors, with the rest consisting of non-executive board members.57 
• Hostile takeovers were virtually invented by U.S. companies. The incentive for the board 
of directors to perform is that if they fail to perform the company could be subjected to a 
hostile takeover.58 However, see disadvantages below for boards’ responses to this threat. 
 
Some of the U.S. disadvantages/weaknesses compared to the U.K.: 
• In the U.S. the chairman of the board and the CEO are the same person in 75 percent of 
the S&P500 companies. This is rare in the U.K.59 It has been suggested that a separation 
of the executive chairman/CEO into a non-executive chairman and an executive CEO 
would help reduce the perceived omnipotent status and would open up the board to more 
dialogue.60 With the non-executive chairman in charge of managing the board while the 
executive CEO manages the business.61 
• Non-executives in the U.S. are often extremely limited in time commitment available for 
each company and often serve on many different company boards.62 
                                                
49 Schmidt and Tyrell, p. 334  
50 Indicates that there is no one controlling shareholder. Widely dispersed ownership. See La Porta, et al, p.478. 
51 La Porta, et al,  p. 492 
52 Oxelheim and Randøy, p 2371 
53 Oxelheim, (2000) p. 35-36 
54 Oxelheim and Randøy, p. 2371  
55 Oxelheim (2000), p. 32 
56 Ibid. p. 33 
57 Keenan, p. 173 
58 Oxelheim (2000), p. 32 
59 Keenan, p. 173 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
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• U.S. companies have increasingly opted to incorporate in the U.S. state of Delaware, 
known for its manager friendly rules of incorporation. This bundled with so-called 
“poison pills” have substantially limited the hostile takeovers63 in recent years. 
 
The two systems each have their strengths and weaknesses. Overall the U.S. financial system is, 
in our opinion, more efficient in regards to capital market efficiency than the U.K. system. 
2.3 Previous studies- Literature Review 
U.S. based research on the effects of outside independent board members, have reached 
inconclusive results. Studies show that independent board members can enhance firm 
performance64, with other studies reaching contradictory results.65 Lars Oxelheim and Trond 
Randøy conducted a similar study with the added angle of examining the effect of outside foreign 
board membership.66 The study involved the effect of Anglo-American board membership on 
corporate performance measured in firm value using Tobin’s Q, on companies with headquarters 
in Norway or Sweden. The study found that in countries with partially integrated financial 
markets “importing” an outsider foreign board member adhering to the Anglo-American 
corporate governance system can create significant value. Additionally, the authors argue that 
recruiting an outsider Anglo-American board member can be seen as an alternative to reduce the 
cost of capital to the more common ways of achieving the global cost of capital. By importing a 
foreign board member, small and medium sized firms achieved a lower cost of capital rather 
inexpensively compared to the substantial expenses incurred with a cross- listing and issuance. A 
study by Nowak and McCabe67 analyzed the perceptions of Australian independent corporate 
directors and their access to information in their role as directors. Their focus was on the 
information cost and information asymmetry involved. The central finding was that information 
asymmetry does exist and directors perceive that the CEO and executive have controlling power 
over information. This is an argument for further study of the effect of importing an outsider 
foreign board member.  
 
Other studies have been conducted on varying corporate governance systems and the relation to 
ownership structures, see La Porta et al.68 for a survey of the literature. The ownership structures 
that have been studied include the concentration of ownership around the globe, the role of large 
shareholders and voting rights involved in controlling the corporation.69 In a study by Claessens70 
of the Czechoslovakian privatization reform of 1992, Claessens investigates the impact of 
corporate governance on two firms with two different shareholder structures ceteris paribus and if 
the firms would trade at different prices. The assumption was that the firm with a less dispersed 
ownership and implicitly better corporate governance would trade at a higher price.71  He found 
that firms with many small owners trade at lower prices and firms with majority ownership of 
one investor commands a higher price. A study of Swiss board conditions involving seat 
                                                
63 Keenan, p. 173 
64 Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) 
65 Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) 
66 Oxelheim and Randøy (2003) 
67 Nowak and McCabe (2003) 
68 La Porta, et al. (1999) 
69 La Porta, et al. p. 471-472 
70 Claessens (1995) 
71 Claessens, p. 2 
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accumulation, one director sitting on numerous boards, found a negative relationship between 
seat accumulation and firm value. 72 This was largely attributed to the conflicts involved in 
holding multiple seats and the time constraint faced by the director.  
 
The impact of diversity, racial and gender has been the topic of numerous studies. In a recent 
study conducted by Farrell and Hersch73 on the effect of gender, they report that during the 90’s 
women on corporate boards has significantly increased. They analyze the effect on boards 
already with female membership and the likelihood of hiring another woman when a board 
member departs. Their findings were that when a woman departs the likelihood of adding another 
woman increases. Additionally they report that women tend to serve on better performing firms’ 
boards and there were no significant abnormal returns associated with the announcement of 
adding a woman to the board. Other studies have reported significant positive correlation 
between board diversity and firm value see, Carter et al.74. The analogy can be argued that well 
performing firms more easily attract U.S. board members and firms that already have or have had 
U.S. board members are more likely to add another U.S. board member.   
 
Early cross-listing studies have focused on market segmentation and the barriers to cross-border 
investments. The logic is that firms in a country considered to have a segmented national capital 
market face a higher cost of capital because of the risk is mainly borne by investors in that 
country.75 Later studies have focused on the legal consequences of cross-listing in the U.S. A 
study by Fuerst76 provides a signaling model allowing “good” firms to separate from “bad” firms 
based on the idea that cross-listing is costly because of the disclosure requirements and legal 
liability imposed on cross-listing firms. However, studies have failed to show that cross-listing in 
the U.S. has led to increased corporate transparency and stricter legal enforcement.77 Other 
studies have shown that firms with a U.S. cross-listing have, positive abnormal returns before and 
at the time of the cross-listing announcement78, have long-horizon returns79, experience declines 
in the cost of capital after the cross-listing80, ease successive equity issues81 and show evidence of 
higher firm valuations measured by Tobin’s Q82.  
2.4 Methods-Literature- Review 
The two most commonly used methods to study the impact of board composition and cross-
listing on firm value are quantitative and meta analysis.  
 
The lion share of the research on the subject uses a quantitative method through utilizing various 
sample sets, descriptive statistics, and means and regression analysis. This is where most studies 
                                                
72 Loderer and Peyer, p. 165 
73 Farrell and Hersch (2004) 
74 Carter, et al. (2003)  
75 Leuz, p. 350 
76 Fuerst (1998) 
77 Leuz, p. 350 
78 Foerster and Karolyi (1999) also Miller (1999) 
79 Foerster and Karolyi (2000) 
80 Errunza and Miller (2000) 
81 Reese and Weisbach (2002) 
82 Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2002) 
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on the subject of board composition and cross-listing’s effect on firm value would be categorized. 
We have chosen to follow this path as is described in chapter three.   
 
Meta-analysis is another method also used by researchers. Meta-analysis is commonly used to 
aggregate results across several studies on a related set of research questions and permits scholars 
to correct for statistical outcomes. This is done to find an estimate of the true relationship 
between two variables.  However, it does not identify causality between the variables.83 Most 
meta-analyses are based on the Hunter-Schmidt method developed by Hunter and Schmidt in 
1990.84 For an example see Dalton85, they use the meta-analysis technique in their study of the 
number of directors and financial performance.86 
2.5 Variables used in previous studies 
In the report, The Impact of Foreign Board Membership on Firm Value Oxelheim and Randøy 
used a variety of independent variables in order to minimize specification bias. They placed their 
control variables in the following groups: international corporate governance variables, general 
corporate governance variables and general control variables. The following control variables 
were used beside the independent variable outsider U.S. board membership and the dependent 
variable Firm value: 87 
 
International corporate governance variables 
• Foreign ownership 
• Foreign listing 
• Foreign subsidiary 
General corporate governance variables 
• Board size 
• Board independence 
• Block holder ownership 
General control variables 
• Firm size 
• Firm age 
• Industry effects 
 
Foreign board members can in general have three different mandates. The first alternative is that 
the board member represents an owner with a major commercial interest in the firm such as a 
foreign direct investment or a subsidiary. A second alternative is that the board member 
represents a foreign owner with a big portfolio stake in the firm. The third alternative is that the 
board member is an independent outsider chosen specifically to signal the company’s willingness 
to be monitored by the rules of a more demanding corporate governance system.88 
 
                                                
83 Dalton, et al. (1999) 
84 Meta-Analysis, Lyons, p. 4 
85 Dalton, et al. (1999) 
86 Ibid. 
87 Oxelheim and Randøy, p. 2382 
88 Ibid. p. 2375  
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In order to isolate the effect of the third type of foreign board members Oxelheim and Randøy 
used foreign ownership as a proxy for foreign portfolio ownership in the absence of reliable data 
on the mandate of foreign board members. They also use a dummy variable for firms that are 
foreign subsidiaries to isolate the effects of outsider Anglo-American board members 
representing the owners of such companies. 
 
Most of these control variables used by Oxelheim and Randøy have been acknowledged in other 
studies, examples are Firm Size89,90, Board Independence or Composition91, Board Size92, 
Industry93, Blockholder Ownership94 , Foreign Listings95, Firm Age96.  
 
Other variables used in further studies to study corporate governance and its impact on firm 
performance and value include but are not limited to minority board membership, including 
female membership97, average age of board members98, number of annual board meetings99, 
duality of the CEO and Chairman roles100, ownership concentration101, national origin of 
incorporation102, return on assets103, beta and alpha values104. 
                                                
89 Dalton, et al. (1999) 
90 Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) 
91 Dalton, et al. (1998) 
92 Dalton, et al. (1999) 
93 Baysinger and Butler (1985) 
94 Thomsen and Pedersen (2000)  
95 Foerster and Karolyi (1999) 
96 Mishra (2001) 
97 Carter, et al. p.40 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Thomsen and Pedersen, p. 696  
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid.  
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3. Methodology 
This chapter presents the methods used in this paper. The method is intended to aid us in 
achieving our purpose.  
 
This study is based on a quantitative methodology. Various statistical techniques are employed in 
an attempt to show the hypothesis’ significance. The intention with the usage of more than one 
statistical technique is to obtain a higher degree of validity of the results. A variety of 
theoretically grounded control variables discussed earlier in this paper are also used in order to 
single out the real effect of the independent variables. 
 
As we have established in the theory section, it is appropriate to choose the U.K. and the U.S. as 
test countries for this study. The reasons for this are the great similarities of the two countries’ 
financial systems. Since the literature used in the theory section suggests that the U.S. financial- 
and corporate governance system are slightly more efficient is it natural to test if it is possible to 
show statistically that U.K. firms can enhance their value by using any of the two strategies of 
either cross-listing in the U.S. market or importing an independent board member from the U.S. 
 
The hypotheses, with corresponding null hypotheses, that we will test in this study are presented 
below. The first hypothesis regarding U.S. listing focuses on the financial integration between 
U.K. and U.S. while the other hypothesis is related to the similarities of these two countries 
corporate governance systems. 
 
H0: The value of U.K. firms is independent of U.S. listing. 
H1: There is a positive relation between U.S. listing and value for U.K. firms. 
 
H0: The value of U.K. firms is independent of outsider U.S. board membership. 
H1: There is a positive relation between outsider U.S. board membership and value for U.K. 
firms. 
3.1 Data 
The data is taken from a random sample of 120 U.K.-based companies traded on the London 
Stock Exchange. U.K.-based are companies who have elected to incorporate in the U.K. and 
based the mainstay of their corporate activities there. Companies belonging to all industries 
except, finance, banking and insurance, are included in order to get results comparable to 
Oxelheim and Randøy’s original study. All firms not listed before January 1, 2000 were also 
omitted since data from three full years from each firm is desirable to achieve a large enough 
sample set.  
  
An alternative methodology would be to begin with dividing the population of all firms in 
categories depending on if they listed in the U.S. or have outsider U.S. board members and then 
take random samples from these sub samples. The advantage with this method is that we would 
be guaranteed to get enough firms from each category. After eliminating all firms listed before 
2000 and the firms belonging to financing-, banking- and insurance industries, we had a 
population of 707 firms. Due to time constraints, we were unable to determine which of these 
firms is listed on U.S. stock exchanges or have outsider U.S. board members. 
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All the variables with the exception of share price were collected from annual reports and firm 
web sites. Share price data were collected from Yahoo Finance and in cases were the country of 
origin of board members were uncertain we employed other secondary sources on the internet 
such as Forbes.com and Google.com to further investigate board members nationality. In cases 
where the needed information could not be found in publicly available sources, questions were 
sent to the firms via e-mail. These enquiries have accounted for 35 additional firm-year 
observations. 
 
The sample consists of 269 firm-year observations from 96 companies. That corresponds to 
information from 80 percent of the sampled firms and 75 percent of the total number of firm-year 
observations. The reason for the lower proportion of firm-year observations is that it was harder 
to obtain the older reports. In addition, some of the observations were excluded because of 
reporting periods longer or shorter than the normal 12 months. The number of observations for 
each year is 81, 92 and 96 for the years 2000, 2001 and 2002. 
3.2 Definition of variables 
We are basing this study on Oxelheim and Randøy’s The Impact of Foreign Board Membership 
on Firm Value105. Consequently, we will start out with the dependent variable firm value, the two 
independent variables U.S. listing and outsider U.S. board membership and the nine control 
variables listed in the beginning of section 2.5 in this thesis. 
 
The dependent variable firm value is measured by the calendar year-end q-value in 2000, 2001 
and 2002. The q-value used in this study and the original study by Oxelheim and Randøy106 
approximates Tobin’s Q107. The difference between the textbook definition of Tobin’s Q and our 
approximation is that the replacement cost of total assets and the market value of total debt are 
approximated by the corresponding book values. Therefore, the q-value is defined as the ratio of 
the market value of the firm to the book value of total assets. In order to reduce heteroskedasticity 
the natural logarithm of the q-value is used as the dependent variable. The market value of the 
firm has been calculated as the number of shares outstanding on the reporting-year-end multiplied 
by the share price of the last close of the previous calendar year. Because of difficulties in 
acquiring the exact number of outstanding shares on the calendar year-end for firms with 
reporting years other than calendar year, we have approximated the number of outstanding shares 
on the calendar year by using the number of shares on the end of the firms reporting year. 
 
U.S. listing is a dummy variable used to identify firms that are listed on one or more of the U.S. 
exchanges such as the New York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ or American Stock Exchange. The 
variable foreign listings measures how many foreign stock exchanges besides the U.S. exchanges 
the firm is listed on. 
 
The explanatory dummy variable outsider U.S. board membership is measured as 1 if one or 
more outsider board member is a citizen of the U.S. and 0 if otherwise. A director in this study is 
considered an insider when he or she is, or has been, directly or indirectly employed by the firm. 
                                                
105 Oxelheim and Randøy (2003) 
106 Ibid. 
107 Gordon and Myers, p. 1  
 19 
The share of outsider U.S. board members is not used since the signalling effect of adherence to 
the U.S. corporate governance system ought to be achieved by inclusion of only one U.S. board 
member.108 Another reason for using a dummy variable instead of the number of board members 
fitting in to the definition or multiple dummies representing various numbers of outsider U.S. 
board members is that very few of the firms have more than one U.S. board member. 
 
As described earlier Oxelheim and Randøy used the variable foreign ownership as a proxy for 
foreign portfolio ownership and a dummy variable for firms that are foreign subsidiaries to 
isolate the effects of outsider Anglo-American board members representing the owners of such 
companies. However, we will exclude these two control variables. Foreign ownership is excluded 
because of the difficulties of obtaining information about the share of a firm’s equity in the hands 
of a specific foreign country. Oxelheim and Randøy used the total proportion of equity owned by 
foreign investors as a proxy of the proportion of equity owned by Anglo-American investors. 
Since U.S. or U.K., investors held two thirds of the Swedish and Norwegian shares held by 
foreigners at that time this motivated the simplification.109 Since we only are interested in the 
proportion of U.K. firms’ equity that are held by U.S. investors, this type of information is not 
publicly available, and no reasonable proxies can be found we are forced to exclude this variable 
from our analysis. Foreign subsidiary is excluded simply because none of the firms in our sample 
fits the definition of a foreign subsidiary110. That is none of the firms has a single U.S. industrial 
owner holding 20 percent or more of the firm’s equity. 
 
Consequently, we only include foreign listing as an international corporate governance variable 
in our study. As mentioned in the limitations to the purpose, U.S. listing will be one of the two 
independent variables used in an attempt to achieve the purpose of this master’s thesis. 
 
The three general corporate governance variables are board size, which is the number of directors 
on the board at the end of each year. Board independence is the percentage of independent 
outside directors and blockholder ownership is the percentage of all shares that are owned by the 
three largest shareholders. 111 
 
The general control variables also taken from Oxelheim and Randøy’s study consist of firm size, 
which is measured by taking the natural logarithm of total revenues for each sample year. The 
motivation for this is that the size alone is not normally distributed. Firm age is measured by the 
natural logarithm of the number of years between the observation year and the firms founding 
year. The industry effects will be controlled for by utilizing dummy variables representing 
following industry groups: Retail and Property, Manufacturing, Information Technology and 
Telecom, Media and Publishing, Shipping and Transportation and Other Industries.112 
 
Besides measuring if a firm is listed on a U.S. stock exchange, we will also determine the total 
number of foreign (non-U.K. or U.S.) stock exchanges each firm is listed on. The motivation for 
using foreign listings as an additional control variable is that we argue that each additional market 
                                                
108 Oxelheim and Randøy, p 2384 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid. p. 2385 
112 Ibid. 
 20 
a firm is listed on should add some value to the firm since each new market brings more potential 
investors to the firm. 
 
Oxelheim and Randøy performed separate tests for each of the three sampled years in order to see 
if the results were stable. We will use a slightly different approach to the problem with market 
conditions changing over time. We will incorporate observation year dummy variables in our 
regression models with the purpose of reducing the variance depending on the difference in 
market conditions and large depreciation of stock market value between the years. Observation 
year dummies are commonly used for this purpose.113 The dummy variables will however only 
capture the variance in firm value due to changing market conditions. As a result, we will also 
carry out regressions of the full model separate for all three years in order to see if the result is 
stable over these years.  
 
The list of the variables we are using in our study follows: 
 
Dependent variable 
Firm value 
 
Independent variables 
U.S. listing 
Outsider U.S. Board Membership 
 
Control variables 
Foreign listings 
Board size 
Board independence 
Block holder Ownership 
Firm size 
Firm age 
Industry 
Observation year 
 
All variables have been measured at the end of the specific firms reporting year except firm 
market value, which is taken from the end of corresponding calendar year in order to eliminate 
influences from time-specific market effects. The reasoning is that large swings in the total 
market value could distort the results. For example, the exceptionally large fall in share values in 
the year 2000 could distort the results because of the high number of firms with reporting years 
other than calendar year. Meaning that firm values of firm reporting in, for example, February 
could be significantly higher or lower than firms reporting in April and this would skew the 
results.   
3.3 Statistics of group difference 
In order to see if there is any difference between firms listed on an U.S. stock exchange and firms 
not listed we will make a simple analysis of the two groups mean values on both the dependent 
variable and the control variables. An independent sample t-test for the equality of means is 
                                                
113 For example, cf. Farrell and Hersch, (2004) 
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employed to test if there are any statistically significant differences between the groups. The 
corresponding analysis is then carried through for firms with and without outsider U.S. board 
members. 
 
In order to employ the t-test in a theoretically correct way the following two conditions must be 
met. Both variables should be normally distributed and the variances ought to be equal in both 
populations. If both samples consists of 30 or more observations the central limit theorem is 
invoked and the t-test is thus in practice not sensitive to deviations from the two mentioned 
assumptions.114 The common way in using t-tests even in situations having small samples is just 
to assume that these two conditions are fulfilled. We will, nevertheless, try to assess how well our 
data material conforms to these criterions. 
 
The normality of the variables will be checked with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-of-fit 
test that can be used to test the fit between any hypothesized distribution and empirical 
distributions.115 In order to test the assumption of equal variances we will use Levene’s 
homogeneity-of-variance test. This test has been criticised for showing too high significances.116 
However, we will use it since we lack a straightforward alternative. 
3.4 Regression over U.S.-listing 
In order to see if the firms listed on a U.S. stock exchange have higher value than other firms do, 
we perform a regression with firm value as the dependent variable and U.S. listing as an 
independent variable. This regression and all other regressions in this study are performed using 
ordinary least square regression technique, abbreviated as OLS-regression. This will be carried 
out with a simple regression model as well as with dummy variables representing the observation 
years. This is done to account for the large depreciation of the total the stock market value under 
the three years in question. The mean of the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q in our sample was 
0.55 in 2000 and fell to 0.32 in 2001 and 0.20 in 2002. 
3.5 Regression over Outsider U.S. Board Membership 
While the U.S.-listing regression measured the effectiveness of the U.S. capital market in 
comparison to the U.K. capital market, the goal of the regression over outsider U.S. board 
membership is to measure the effectiveness of U.S. corporate governance in comparison to U.K. 
corporate governance. The analysis is done in the same way as the corresponding regression over 
a U.S. listing both with and without observation year dummies. 
3.6 Multiple regression 
Since it is reasonable to suspect that the variables, U.S. listing and outsider U.S. board 
membership may be correlated, we will also perform a multiple regression in an attempt to 
separate the effects of these two variables. The simple model with the two independent variables 
will also be extended with multiple control variables as discussed in section 2.4 and more closely 
defined in section 3.3. This analysis is based on the same methodology Oxelheim and Randøy 
used in their study of the impact of foreign board membership in Sweden and Norway117.  
                                                
114 Miller and Miller, p 269-271 
115 Hogg and Tanis, p 544-548 
116 O’Neill and Mathews, p 81 
117 Oxelheim and Randøy (2003) 
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The full model of the relation between U.S. listing, outsider U.S. Board Membership, firm value 
and the control variables are as follows: 
 
Firm value = α + β1 * U.S. Listing + β2 * outsider U.S. Board Membership + β3 * Foreign listings 
+ β4 * Board Size + β5 * Board Independence + β6 * Block holder Ownership + β7 * Firm Size + 
β8 * Firm Age + βi * Industry Dummies + βj * Observation year dummies 
3.7 Regression Diagnostics 
The usage of the OLS regression techniques calls for testing if these techniques really are 
applicable to use on the specific data material. Some of the underlying assumptions for the 
multiple linear regression model to hold are:118 
 
1. Linear relationship between dependent and independent variables. 
2. Homoscedasticity. All the residuals are identically distributed with the same conditional 
variance. 
3. The residuals are normality distributed for a given value of the independent variable. 
 
If these assumptions are violated the result is that the regression model must be interpreted with 
some caution. The easiest way to confirm the first two assumptions are to plot the residuals from 
each independent variable against the dependent variable. If these diagrams do not reveal any 
patterns then these assumptions hold. 
 
Assumption 3 is also easily checked by making a plot of both the observed residuals and the 
expected normal distribution of residuals or by making a histogram of the residuals accompanied 
by a normal function curve. 
 
Another problem that must be controlled for is multicollinearity. This arises when explanatory 
variables have approximate linear relationships. When two independent variables are highly 
correlated, it is in practice impossible to simply hold one constant and change the other as the 
multiple regression model assumes.119 An often-used measure of collinearity is the variance 
inflation factor (VIF).120 A rule of thumb for evaluating VIF is to be concerned with any value 
larger than 10.0. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
118 Ramanathan, p. 76-121 
119 Ibid. p. 210 
120 Kleinbaum, et al. p. 210. 
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4. Results 
 In this chapter we account for the results of our study. We present the statistics obtained from 
our regression models and the notable findings. For a more detailed presentation we refer to the 
appendices one through seven.   
4.1 Statistics of group difference 
In this first part of the chapter we describe how the companies in the sample compare to the 
variables used. In appendix 1, we account for the average values and the t-test used to find if any 
significant differences for the variables exist. First we look at the whole sample then we divide 
them into, U.S. listed or not, and U.S. board member or not. It could also have been interesting to 
further study the companies, which both are U.S. listed and have a U.S. board member, however, 
in our sample this included three companies and therefore would not have yielded any valid 
results.  
 
Of the U.S. listed companies, 39 percent (of the firm-year observations) have a U.S. board 
member while 18 percent of the non-U.S. listed has a U.S. board member. Correspondingly, of 
companies with a U.S. board member 18 percent are listed in the U.S. compared with only 7 
percent of the non-U.S. listed companies. This indicates that there is a positive correlation 
between the two independent variables, U.S. listing and U.S. board member. Evidence of this is 
that the two variables have a Pearson Correlation value of 0.157 with p=0.010**. Overall, it is 
more common amongst U.K. firms to import a U.S. board member (19%) than to list on U.S. 
exchanges (9%). 
 
Below are the significant characteristics for the firms analyzed. 
 
Characteristics for U.S. listed firms: 
• Younger. Average firm age is 16 years compared with 48 years for all others  
• Firm size measured by turnover does not have an impact  
• Larger boards. On average 1.5 more board members  
• The proportion of independent board members is larger 
• Ownership is more dispersed  
• Listed on other foreign exchanges, 6.4 exchanges (U.S. exchanges accounted for) 
compared to 1.2 for other firms  
• Firm value is significantly higher for the sample of U.S. listed firms and for the industry 
group, media and publishing industries  
 
Characteristics for firms with outsider U.S. board members: 
• Firm age is insignificant  
• Firms have higher turnover, £416M compared with £185M 
• On average two more board members 
• Larger proportion of independent board members 
• Ownership structure has no impact 
• Firms are on average listed on 3.0 foreign exchanges (U.S. exchanges accounted for) 
compared to 1.4 for other firms  
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• Firm value is not affected by outsider U.S. board members except for  the industry group 
shipping and transportation where firm value is significantly higher 
4.2 Regression over U.S.-listing 
The regression addressing U.S. listing is in appendix 2. First we disclose the result from the 
simple regression with only U.S. listing as explanatory variable. This is followed by the same 
regression with dummy variables added for each observation year to isolate the seasonality 
effects.  
 
Both these regression models are strongly significant with p-values 0.001*** and 0.000***. The 
independent variable U.S.-listing is also significant with a p-value of 0.001*** in both models. 
The coefficient is positive with a value between 0.42-0.44, which means that firms listed on U.S. 
markets on average are valued more highly than other firms. The R2 value for the simple 
regression is 0.039 which indicates that 3.9 percent of the variation in the firms value, as 
calculated as the natural log of Tobin’s Q, is explained by if the firms are listed in the U.S. or not.  
4.3 Regression over Outsider U.S. Board Membership 
In appendix 3, similarly we address the regressions covering U.S. board membership with and 
without observation year dummy variables. The first simple regression shows no significance for 
either the model or the independent variable U.S. board member. When the model is expanded to 
include observation year dummies, it achieves significance. However, the independent variable of 
U.S. board member does still not obtain any significant results. This indicates that we cannot 
conclude if U.K. firms with a U.S. board member are valued differently than other firms.    
4.4 Multiple regression 
In appendices 4-6 we present the complete results from the multiple regression models and in the 
table below we highlight the noteworthy findings.  
 
 basic model + obs. year dummies + foreign listings 
R2 ,197 ,248 ,294 
R2adj ,160 ,206 ,252 
 Β p-value β p-value β p-value 
U.S. listing ,222 ,114 ,250 ,068 -,022 ,881 
Outsider U.S. Board Member -,056 ,573 -,075 ,434 -,087 ,351 
Board size ,078 ,000*** ,077 ,000*** ,054 ,001*** 
Board independence -,004 ,122 -,004 ,178 -,005 ,052 
Blockholder ownership -,004 ,094 -,004 ,128 -,003 ,205 
Firm size -,017 ,476 -,013 ,570 -,025 ,262 
Firm age -,043 ,340 -,041 ,355 -,062 ,149 
Foreign listings - - - - ,079 ,000*** 
 
The table shows that neither U.S.-listing nor outsider U.S. board member present significant 
results when the control variables are accounted for. Most notably the significance is lower for 
U.S. listing and the β-value is negative when the variable foreign listing is introduced in the last 
regression model.  
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The reason for the higher significance for U.S. listing before introducing the foreign listing 
variable is that these two variables are highly correlated; A Pearson Correlation value of 0.506, 
p=0.000*** and that foreign listings influences the firms value. 
 
Of the control variables, it is only board size, foreign listings, observation year dummies, as well 
as some of the industry dummies that show significance. The control variables have strongly 
contributed to the model’s explanatory value, which is indicated by the increase of R2 and R2adj to 
0.294 and 0.252 in the final model from 0.097 and 0.087 in the simple regression model on U.S. 
listing with observation year dummies. 
 
In Appendix 7 we have a summary of the regressions carried out on the complete model for each 
observation year. The results are similar to the outcome of the regression on all three years with 
observation year dummies but with a bit lower significances due to the reduced number of 
observations. 
4.5 Diagnostics 
The results from the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality and Levene’s test for equality of 
variances are presented in Appendix 8. The normality test was performed on the complete 
variables as well as the variables grouped according to the variables U.S. listing and outsider U.S. 
board member. The equality of variances test is also presented for the variables grouped 
according to U.S. listing and outsider U.S. board member. 
 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test demonstrates that all variables are normally distributed when 
looking at the complete sample of observations. Some of the variables do however not show 
significance of normality when they are grouped according to U.S. listing and outsider U.S. board 
member. Since all the occurrences of this problem but one is localized in the smaller groups, 
n=23 and n=51, we conclude that the prerequisite of normally distributed variables is satisfyingly 
fulfilled. 
 
The test for equality of variances is naturally also affected by the problem with small number of 
observations in one of the groups. In spite of this, half of the tests show significance for equal 
variances. Five of the seven (grouped) variables not showing significance are also grouped by 
outsider U.S. board member and have thereby n=218 and 51 which invokes the central limit 
theorem so that the variables do not need to fulfil the equality of variances condition. 
 
The regression diagnostics also confirm that the methods used are applicable on this data 
material. The residual plots presented in Appendix 9 do not show any patterns that could lead us 
to the conclusion that the relationship between the dependent and the independent variables could 
be non-linear. The plots also confirm the homocedasticity criterion. The VIF values measuring 
collinearity are reported directly in connection to the regressions in Appendices 2-6. The highest 
VIF-value 2,011 confirms that there is no multicollinearity problem either. The last diagram in 
Appendix 9 presents a histogram showing that the residuals are fairly well normally distributed. 
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4.4 Summary of the results 
The results show that it is more common among U.K. firms to import an outsider U.S. board 
member than to list on a U.S. exchange. There is also a positive correlation between outsider U.S. 
board membership and U.S. listing. Common to the groups with outsider U.S. board members 
and U.S. listing is that they have significantly larger boards with a higher degree of independence 
and are listed on more foreign exchanges than other firms are. The differences we observe 
between these two groups are that a firm that is listed in the U.S. is significantly younger than 
other firms are and have a more dispersed ownership structure. Firms with outsider U.S. board 
members are also significantly larger than other firms. 
 
The most interesting difference is that firms listed in the U.S. have a higher value than the other 
firms do, while outsider U.S. board membership does not affect firm value. This result is 
confirmed by high significances for the simple regression with U.S. listing as sole independent 
variable. Maybe more important for our conclusions is the fact that the effect disappears when the 
control variables, and especially the variable foreign listings, are introduced in the regression 
model. 
 
In the end, we failed to show significance for both our hypotheses. Either U.S. listing or outsider 
U.S. board membership does not affect U.K. firms’ value. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 27 
5. Analysis 
This chapter contains our analysis of the results obtained in chapter four. We elaborate on 
underlying reasons for our findings. 
 
U.K. firms might to a higher degree choose to approach the U.S. market by having a U.S. board 
member because of the lower cost incurred compared to a U.S. listing. It could also be argued 
that U.K. firms believe that the U.K. capital market is well integrated with the U.S. capital market 
and therefore they conclude that a listing on the U.S. market is superfluous. If this is the case a 
reason for importing a U.S. board member could be that the board member’s personal network is 
a means to approach the U.S. market for the firm’s products. Another reason could be that the 
firm thinks there are significant differences between the corporate governance systems in U.S. 
and would like to signal adherence to what they consider a superior system. 
 
The explanation why younger firms tend to be U.S. listed could be that these firms could have 
had an increased need for capital and faced difficulties raising capital in the home market 
compared with the older, more established firms. The U.S. listed firms have a larger proportion of 
independent board members, which is a mirror image of the conditions on the U.S. market where 
it is common that only the CEO and CFO are the non-independent board members.121 Block 
holder ownership is lower amongst the U.S. listed firms, which is one of the effects of a foreign 
listing, it leads to an increased opportunity for a larger pool of investors to purchase shares. This 
distinction could also depend on the fact that owners of firms with concentrated ownership and 
therefore large block holders are less willing to give up control to gain additional foreign owners.  
 
The fact that U.S. listed companies have further foreign listings appears natural when we 
consider the fact that the firms prefer easy access to capital. The mean firm value for U.S. listed 
firms is higher for all industry groups. The Media and Publishing industries was the only industry 
group with a statistically significant result, which can be explained by the few observations in 
some of the industry groups. 
 
Firms with higher turnover are more likely to have a U.S. board member. We attribute this to the 
internationalization of these firms and therefore these firms are better equipped to realize the 
benefits of incorporating a U.S. board member. However, the reverse could also be true, that 
firms that are more internationalized attracts foreign board members. Unfortunately in our study, 
we are unable to determine the causality between the variables, however we are able to measure 
the correlation. 
 
The fact that boards with a U.S. board member tend to be larger could be an indication that the 
foreign independent board member is simply an addition to the existing board. Board 
independence is also higher for these firms, which we argue, can be attributed to the added 
independent U.S. board member although it could also be the intention of the firm to replicate the 
independence prevalent in U.S. firms. 
 
                                                
121 Keenan, p. 175.  
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The lack of correlation between block holder ownership and U.S. board member is further 
evidence that firms with concentrated ownership also incorporate a U.S. board member. This is 
indicative of that firms with concentrated ownership can approach the U.S. market via including 
a U.S. board member without having to list on a U.S. exchange, which over time could lead to 
undesired changes in ownership structure. If firms with a U.S. board member are more 
internationalized it also seems natural for these firms to be listed on additional foreign markets 
than other firms. In chapter four we reported just that. However, these firms are on average only 
listed on 2.8 foreign exchanges compared with U.S. listed firms that were listed on 5.4 foreign 
exchanges (plus the U.S. exchange). The rationale could be the differing motivations for 
approaching the U.S. market. U.S. listed firms approach the U.S. market to achieve increased 
access to lower cost of capital while firms with a U.S. board member approach the U.S. market to 
utilize the U.S. board member’s network, experiences and know how from the U.S. product 
market.   
 
The two simpler regression models, as was mentioned earlier, displayed significance for U.S. 
listing and its positive impact on firm value. The complete model including all control variables 
did not display any evidence for this result. This is an indication that it is not U.S. listing by itself 
that effects firm value, instead firm value is affected by one or some of the control variables that 
are correlated with U.S. listing. The most notable difference in significance arose when the 
variable foreign listing was included in the model. This is of course not surprising since we have 
already shown the correlation between these two variables and that foreign listing has a strong 
significant effect on firm value.  
 
These results are even more interesting since the U.S. markets are not included in foreign listings.  
If it is the case that listing in the U.S. increases firm value as does all other foreign listings, U.S. 
listing should display a significant positive coefficient. However, this is not the case, the 
coefficient is far from significant with a p-value of 0.881 and is slightly negative. This indicates 
that a U.S. listing does not have any effect on firm value while other foreign listings do increase 
firm value. We interpret this as the U.S. capital market being well integrated with the U.K. 
market and more so than with other markets, mainly European markets, on which the firms in our 
sample are often listed on. Since all U.S. listed firms in our sample are listed on at least four other 
foreign exchanges we unfortunately do not have any opportunity to investigate the effect of U.S. 
listing on firms that do not have any additional foreign listings. 
 
Another issue that becomes known with these results is the, if it is appropriate, use the U.S. cost 
of capital as a proxy for the global cost of capital. Our results could indicate that U.S.-U.K. have 
similar cost of capital by the non-effect of a U.S. listing on U.K. firms. However, it is also 
evident by the results that U.K. companies can lower their cost of capital by listing on other non-
U.S. markets that are less integrated with the U.K. capital market. These results could be an 
indication that it is not the capital cost in the country of listing that directly effects firm value but 
simply the increased supply of investors available drives the firm value at a foreign cross-listing. 
This indication would be in line with the enlargement of the set of potential investors available to 
cross-listing firm as found in prior studies. This leads to the conclusion that the U.S. cost of 
capital is higher than the global cost of capital and therefore may not be suitable as a proxy for it. 
Nevertheless, it is still the best proxy available concerning the difficulties associated with 
measuring the global cost of capital.  
 
 29 
Since none of our hypotheses are supported by the data we must accept the null hypotheses that 
U.S. listing or outsider U.S. board membership does not affect U.K. firm value. This shows that 
the U.K. and U.S. markets are well integrated both in regards to the financial markets and 
corporate governance. The stable result for the three years of observation is a strong indication of 
the validity of the results.  
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6. Conclusions 
In this chapter we draw conclusions from the results obtained in our quantitative study. We also 
give recommendations to firms trying to achieve a global cost of capital. Lastly, we suggest 
future avenues of research.  
 
As previous studies have suggested cross-listing on a foreign market considered more integrated 
compared to the home market, can create substantial value and lower the cost of capital for firms. 
Oxelheim and Randøy found that firms, in markets only partially integrated, can create value by 
importing an Anglo-American board member.  
 
By using the approach suggested by Oxelheim and Randøy122, incorporating a foreign board 
member, with our twist of adding a board member from a similar corporate governance system, 
we found that this did not increase firm value. Therefore it did not have the desired effect 
suggested by Oxelheim and Randøy in respect to two markets considered well integrated. 
 
We argued that while importing a U.S. independent board member does not create firm value 
firms do this to tap into the board member’s know how, and market specific network. Firms cross 
list to have increased and easier access to investors and capital.   
 
Our study found that U.K. firms could not create value or lower cost of capital by cross-listing on 
the U.S. market, considered a well-integrated foreign market. However, the results indicate that 
firm value can be created by cross-listing on less well-integrated foreign markets. We found that 
the U.S. and U.K. markets are well integrated and in regards to both financial and corporate 
governance systems. We also conclude that the U.S. cost of capital is a poor proxy for the global 
cost of capital.  
 
Further research is needed to analyze two or more similar corporate governance systems and see 
if the effects of cross-listing or importing a foreign board member hold across markets and 
corporate governance systems. Another avenue for further research is to find and accurately 
measure the global cost of capital.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
122 Oxelheim and Randøy (2003) 
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Appendix 1. Statistics of group differences 
 
Variables 
Full 
Sample U.S. listing
Non U.S. 
listing   
U.S. Board 
Membership
Non-U.S. 
Board 
Membership  
 n=269 n=23 n=240 
t-test for 
equality  n=56 n=218 
t-test for 
equality 
    of Means    of Means 
 Mean Mean Mean p-value  Mean Mean p-value 
U.S. Listing 9%      18% 7% ,012*
Outsider U.S. Board Membership 19%  39% 18% ,012*     
          
Firm age (ln) 3,78  2,74 3,87 ,000***  3,73 3,78 ,702
Firm size (ln turnover) 5,36  5,48 5,37 ,773  6,03 5,22 ,005**
Board size 8,22  9,52 8,15 ,007**  9,82 7,9 ,000***
Board independence 47,19%  57,55% 45,88% ,000***  53,20% 45,38% ,000***
Blockholder ownership 28,30%  16,81% 28,38% ,000***  27,47% 27,34% ,954
Foreign listings 1,55  5,39 1,22 ,000***  2,82 1,29 ,000***
          
Firm Value (log q-value)          
All Industries (n=269) 0,32  0,71 0,3 ,002**  0,38 0,33 ,545
Retail and Property Industries (n=70) 0,11  0,36 0,1 ,296  0,27 0,07 ,132
Manufacturing Industry (n=62) 0,35  0,74 0,33 ,234  0,24 0,38 ,430
Information Technology and Telecom 
Industries (n=14) 0,41  - 0,41 -  0,41 0,41 ,995
Media and Publishing Industries (n=23) 0,59  1,81 0,54 ,034*  - 0,59 -
Shipping and Transportation Industries (n=26) 0,19  - 0,19 -  0,55 0,09 ,000***
Other Industries (n=74) 0,45  0,7 0,38 ,149  0,55 0,43 ,621
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Appendix 2. Regression over U.S.-listing 
 
Model 1 – minimal model 
Dependent Variable: Tobins Q (ln) 
 
Model Summary 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
,197 ,039 ,035 
 
ANOVA 
  
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 3,770 1 3,770 10,729 ,001*** 
Residual 93,814 267 ,351   
Total 97,583 268    
 
Coefficients 
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients t Sig. Collinearity Statistics 
  B Std. Error     Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) ,288 ,038 7,618 ,000***    
U.S. listing ,423 ,129 3,276 ,001*** 1,000 1,000 
 
Model 2 – including observation year dummies 
Dependent Variable: Tobins Q (ln) 
 
Model Summary 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
,312 ,097 ,087 
 
ANOVA 
  
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 9,503 3 3,168 9,530 ,000*** 
Residual 88,081 265 ,332   
Total 97,583 268    
 
Coefficients 
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients t Sig. Collinearity Statistics 
  B Std. Error     Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) ,492 ,065 7,602 ,000***   
U.S. listing ,438 ,126 3,485 ,001*** ,999 1,001
2002 dummy -,360 ,087 -4,133 ,000*** ,711 1,406
2001 dummy -,225 ,088 -2,566 ,011* ,711 1,406
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Appendix 3. Regression over Outsider U.S. Board Membership 
 
Model 1 – minimal model 
Dependent Variable: Tobins Q (ln) 
 
Model Summary 
R R Square Adjusted R Square 
,047 ,002 -,001
 
ANOVA 
  
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression ,219 1 ,219 ,600 ,439
Residual 97,365 267 ,365   
Total 97,583 268    
 
Coefficients 
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients t Sig. Collinearity Statistics 
  B Std. Error     Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) ,310 ,041 7,587 ,000   
Outsider U.S. Board 
Membership ,073 ,094 ,775 ,439 1,000 1,000
 
Model 2 – including observation year dummies 
Dependent Variable: Tobins Q (ln) 
 
Model Summary 
R R Square Adjusted R Square 
,240 ,058 ,047
 
ANOVA 
  
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 5,615 3 1,872 5,393 ,001*** 
Residual 91,969 265 ,347   
Total 97,583 268    
 
Coefficients 
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients t Sig. Collinearity Statistics 
  B Std. Error     Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) ,512 ,068 7,503 ,000***   
Outsider U.S. Board 
Membership ,060 ,092 ,658 ,511 ,999 1,001
2002 dummy -,349 ,089 -3,925 ,000*** ,711 1,407
2001 dummy -,218 ,090 -2,431 ,016* ,711 1,406
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Appendix 4. Multiple regression – basic model 
 
Dependent Variable: Tobins Q (ln) 
 
Model Summary 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
,444 ,197 ,160 
 
ANOVA 
  
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 19,247 12 1,604 5,241 ,000*** 
Residual 78,337 256 ,306   
Total 97,583 268    
 
Coefficients 
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients t Sig. Collinearity Statistics 
  B Std. Error     Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) ,310 ,261 1,188 ,236    
U.S. listing ,222 ,140 1,586 ,114 ,744 1,343 
Outsider U.S. Board 
Membership -,056 ,099 -,565 ,573 ,761 1,314 
Board size ,078 ,017 4,678 ,000*** ,748 1,336 
Board independence -,004 ,003 -1,553 ,122 ,849 1,178 
Blockholder ownership -,004 ,003 -1,681 ,094 ,776 1,289 
Firm size (ln turnover) -,017 ,023 -,714 ,476 ,635 1,574 
Firm age (ln) -,043 ,045 -,955 ,340 ,615 1,625 
Retail and Property dummy 
-,271 ,102 -2,649 ,009** ,563 1,776 
Manufacturing Industry dummy 
,016 ,108 ,149 ,882 ,555 1,803 
Information Technology and 
Telecom dummy ,104 ,168 ,619 ,537 ,820 1,219 
Media and Publishing dummy 
,177 ,138 1,283 ,201 ,761 1,315 
Shipping and Transportation 
Industry dummy -,249 ,145 -1,720 ,087 ,622 1,608 
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Appendix 5. Multiple regression – including observation year 
dummies 
Dependent Variable: Tobins Q (ln) 
 
 
Model Summary 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
,498 ,248 ,206 
 
ANOVA 
  
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 24,191 14 1,728 5,980 ,000*** 
Residual 73,392 254 ,289   
Total 97,583 268    
 
Coefficients 
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients t Sig. Collinearity Statistics 
  B Std. Error     Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) ,436 ,257 1,693 ,092    
U.S. listing ,250 ,136 1,835 ,068 ,742 1,347 
Outsider U.S. Board 
Membership -,075 ,096 -,784 ,434 ,759 1,318 
Board size ,077 ,016 4,721 ,000*** ,748 1,337 
Board independence -,004 ,003 -1,352 ,178 ,842 1,188 
Blockholder ownership -,004 ,002 -1,529 ,128 ,771 1,296 
Firm size (ln turnover) -,013 ,023 -,569 ,570 ,634 1,578 
Firm age (ln) -,041 ,044 -,926 ,355 ,615 1,627 
Retail and Property 
dummy -,260 ,100 -2,613 ,010** ,563 1,777 
Manufacturing Industry 
dummy ,024 ,105 ,232 ,816 ,554 1,804 
Information Technology 
and Telecom dummy ,122 ,163 ,751 ,453 ,820 1,220 
Media and Publishing 
dummy ,194 ,134 1,446 ,149 ,760 1,316 
Shipping and 
Transportation Industry 
dummy -,233 ,141 -1,653 ,099 ,621 1,610 
2002 dummy -,335 ,082 -4,105 ,000*** ,702 1,425 
2001 dummy -,216 ,082 -2,627 ,009** ,708 1,413 
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Appendix 6. Multiple regression – full model including Foreign 
Listings 
 
Dependent Variable: Tobins Q (ln) 
 
Model Summary 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
,542 ,294 ,252 
 
ANOVA 
  
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 28,649 15 1,910 7,010 ,000*** 
Residual 68,934 253 ,272   
Total 97,583 268    
 
Coefficients 
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients t Sig. Collinearity Statistics 
  B Std. Error     Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) ,663 ,256 2,589 ,010**   
U.S. listing -,022 ,148 -,150 ,881 ,590 1,695
Outsider U.S. Board 
Membership -,087 ,093 -,935 ,351 ,758 1,319
Board size ,054 ,017 3,239 ,001*** ,665 1,504
Board independence -,005 ,003 -1,951 ,052 ,825 1,212
Blockholder ownership -,003 ,002 -1,271 ,205 ,767 1,303
Firm size (ln turnover) -,025 ,022 -1,125 ,262 ,622 1,607
Firm age (ln) -,062 ,043 -1,446 ,149 ,605 1,652
Retail and Property 
dummy -,175 ,099 -1,765 ,079 ,537 1,862
Manufacturing 
Industry dummy ,120 ,104 1,153 ,250 ,526 1,902
Information 
Technology and 
Telecom dummy 
-,003 ,161 -,021 ,983 ,789 1,267
Media and Publishing 
dummy ,289 ,133 2,178 ,030* ,736 1,358
Shipping and 
Transportation 
Industry dummy -,197 ,137 -1,438 ,152 ,619 1,617
2002 dummy -,329 ,079 -4,144 ,000*** ,702 1,425
2001 dummy -,206 ,080 -2,576 ,011* ,707 1,415
Foreign listing ,079 ,020 4,045 ,000*** ,497 2,011
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Appendix 7. Multiple regression – full model year by year 
 
Year R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
2000 ,557 ,310 ,176
2001 ,561 ,314 ,200
2002 ,524 ,274 ,159
 
Year   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 14,003 13 1,077 2,317 ,013* 
Residual 31,143 67 0,465     
2000 
Total 45,147 80       
Regression 7,357 13 0,566 2,749 ,003** 
Residual 16,054 78 0,206     
2001 
Total 23,411 91       
Regression 6,462 13 0,497 2,384 ,009** 
Residual 17,099 82 0,209     
2002 
Total 23,561 95       
 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Year   B Std. Error t Sig. 
(Constant) 1,249 ,580 2,155 ,035* 
U.S. listing -,495 ,360 -1,374 ,174 
Outsider U.S. Board Membership -,049 ,211 -0,233 ,817 
Board size ,049 ,043 1,145 ,256 
Board independence -,007 ,006 -1,141 ,258 
Blockholder ownership -,002 ,006 -0,421 ,675 
Firm size (ln turnover) -,054 ,049 -1,096 ,277 
Firm age (ln) -,146 ,099 -1,480 ,144 
2000 
Foreign listing ,118 ,047 2,513 ,014* 
(Constant) ,134 ,396 0,337 ,737 
U.S. listing ,192 ,237 0,809 ,421 
Outsider U.S. Board Membership -,080 ,142 -0,563 ,575 
Board size ,055 ,027 2,054 ,043* 
Board independence -,003 ,004 -0,907 ,367 
Blockholder ownership -,004 ,004 -1,058 ,293 
Firm size (ln turnover) -,006 ,034 -0,173 ,863 
Firm age (ln) -,021 ,068 -0,310 ,758 
2001 
Foreign listing ,063 ,031 2,038 ,045* 
(Constant) -,001 ,390 -0,002 ,999 
U.S. listing ,214 ,209 1,025 ,308 
Outsider U.S. Board Membership -,170 ,144 -1,179 ,242 
Board size ,050 ,024 2,135 ,036* 
Board independence -,004 ,004 -1,128 ,262 
Blockholder ownership -,002 ,003 -0,601 ,550 
Firm size (ln turnover) -,008 ,035 -0,240 ,811 
Firm age (ln) -,005 ,064 -0,082 ,935 
2002 
Foreign listing ,054 ,029 1,875 ,064 
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Appendix 8. Diagnostics 
 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of Normality  
      
Complete variables n 
p-
value    
Firm age (ln) 269 ,004    
Tobins Q (ln) 269 ,000    
Firm size (ln turnover) 269 ,026    
Board size 269 ,000    
Board independence 269 ,000    
Outsider U.S. Board Membership 269 ,000    
U.S. listing 269 ,000    
Blockholder ownership 269 ,000    
Foreign listings 269 ,000    
      
Not listed in the U.S.   Listed in the U.S. n 
p-
value 
Firm age (ln) 246 ,002 Firm age (ln) 23 >,200
Tobins Q (ln) 246 ,000 Tobins Q (ln) 23 ,018
Firm size (ln turnover) 246 ,093 Firm size (ln turnover) 23 ,000
Board size 246 ,000 Board size 23 ,082
Board independence 246 ,000 Board independence 23 ,060
Outsider U.S. Board Membership 246 ,000 Outsider U.S. Board Membership 23 ,000
Blockholder ownership 246 ,000 Blockholder ownership 23 >,200
Foreign listings 246 ,000 Foreign listings 23 ,031
      
No Outsider U.S. Board Membership  Outsider U.S. Board Membership  
Firm age (ln) 218 ,001 Firm age (ln) 51 >,200
Tobins Q (ln) 218 ,000 Tobins Q (ln) 51 ,092
Firm size (ln turnover) 218 ,000 Firm size (ln turnover) 51 ,000
Board size 218 ,000 Board size 51 ,000
Board independence 218 ,001 Board independence 51 ,115
U.S. listing 218 ,000 U.S. listing 51 ,060
Blockholder ownership 218 ,000 Blockholder ownership 51 ,000
Foreign listings 218 ,000 Foreign listings 51 ,000
 
 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances 
     
Not listed in the U.S. vs. Listed in the U.S.   
No Outsider U.S. Board Membership vs. 
Outsider U.S. Board Membership 
Variable p-value  Variable p-value
Firm age (ln) ,444  Firm age (ln) ,013
Firm size (ln turnover) ,000  Firm size (ln turnover) ,210
Board size ,233  Board size ,843
Board independence ,028  Board independence ,457
Blockholder ownership ,002  Blockholder ownership ,506
Foreign listings ,009  Foreign listings ,151
Outsider U.S. Board Membership ,000  U.S. listing ,000
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Appendix 9. Diagnostics - diagrams 
 
-0,5 0,0 0,5 1,0
Independent US Board Membership
-2
-1
0
1
2
To
bi
ns
 Q
 (l
n)
Dependent Variable: Tobins Q (ln)
Partial Regression Plot
-0,6 -0,3 0,0 0,3 0,6 0,9
US listing
-2
-1
0
1
2
To
bi
ns
 Q
 (l
n)
Dependent Variable: Tobins Q (ln)
Partial Regression Plot
-2 -1 0 1 2
Firm age (ln)
-2
-1
0
1
2
To
bi
ns
 Q
 (l
n)
Dependent Variable: Tobins Q (ln)
Partial Regression Plot
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4
Firm size (ln turnover)
-2
-1
0
1
2
To
bi
ns
 Q
 (l
n)
Dependent Variable: Tobins Q (ln)
Partial Regression Plot
-5 0 5 10
Board size
-2
-1
0
1
2
To
bi
ns
 Q
 (l
n)
Dependent Variable: Tobins Q (ln)
Partial Regression Plot
-40 -20 0 20 40
Board independence
-2
-1
0
1
2
To
bi
ns
 Q
 (l
n)
Dependent Variable: Tobins Q (ln)
Partial Regression Plot
 
 44 
-20 0 20 40
Blockholder ownership
-2
-1
0
1
2
To
bi
ns
 Q
 (l
n)
Dependent Variable: Tobins Q (ln)
Partial Regression Plot
-4 -2 0 2 4 6
Foreign listing
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
To
bi
ns
 Q
 (l
n)
Dependent Variable: Tobins Q (ln)
Partial Regression Plot
 
-4 -2 0 2 4
Regression Standardized Residual
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Mean = -8,35E-17
Std. Dev. = 0,972
N = 269
Dependent Variable: Tobins Q (ln)
Histogram
 
 
 
 
